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This paper deals with the problem of coalition formation in the setting of an econ-
omy with limited communication between agents. Starting point of our analysis is a
model in which the abilities to communicate are described by a deterministic graph.
Every agent in this graph is characterized by some tuple of attributes in some at-
tribute space. Using this typology we describe some general features, the model of
coalition formation, that is based on this characterization, has to satisfy. We then
arrive at a model with a coalitional structure which describes the constraints on
communication between agents indirectly by the description of all allowable coali-
tiona. This method provides thus a way from a graph theoretic approach to the
well known measure theoretic approach of large economies.
Finally the paper also describes a specific example of such a model of coalition
formation, which is based on organisation structures, depending upon the commu-
nication abilities of the agents in the economy as described in the graph theoretic
model. This specific example is of importance, because it links the theory of the
organisation of economic decision processes with general equilibrium and core the-
ory.1 Introduction
In the literature there is a growing interest in the subject of limited communication
between economic agents. In this paper we investigate in the setting of general
equilibrium theory some consequences of such constraints in communication on the
process of coalition formation. Coalition formation is especially important for the
study of cooperative equilibrium concepts such as the core and the óargaining aet.
In the traditional setting, as presented in Hildenbrand (1974), there are
no limitations in communication and therefore in principle every group of economic
agents is a feasible coalition. Hence, the problem of coalition formation is reduced to
the problem of giving a consistent description of all groups of agents in the economy.
For a large economy this leads to some severe problems. (For an overview of these
problems we refer to Hammond et al. (1987) and Gilles (1987).)
In case of limited communication between agents in the economy, the pro-
cess of coalition formation is, however, non-trivial. The description of all feasible
coalitions is heavily depending upon the description of communication possibili-
ties of the economic agents. In this paper we focus on two different approaches in
describing the (limited) communication abilities of the agents in the economy. It
is our purpose to present a method, which transforms a model based on the first
approach into a model, which is based on the second approach.
The first approach which we mention is an indirect approach of describing
imperfect communication between economic agents. The models start from a struc-
ture of allowable coalitions, and therefore we can speak of a coalitional approach.
The first important paper in this field is from Aumann and Drèze (1974) in which
they present an economy with a so-called coalition structure. The set of agents is
divided into a partition of coalitions. All allowable or "truly" feasible coalitions are
therefore restricted by this partition. It is assumed that there is no communication
between coalitions in the partition other than through the market. For a recent
application of the idea of a coalition structure on core-equivalence theory, we refer
to Greenberg and Weber (1983).
Another method which fits within the coalitional approach has been de-
veloped in Gilles (1987). He starts with a certain collection of truly feasible, or
naturally feasible coalitions, called primitive coalitions. Such coalitional structures
consisting of primitive coalitions are generalizations of the notion of coalition struc-
1ture as described above. Here the constraints in communication are implicitly
translated in restrictions on coalition formation, although the process of coalition
formation itself is not modelled completely. The very nature of the formation of
primitive coalitions is not revealed at all.
We also mention the work of Hammond et al. (1987) in which "full" com-
munication in a large, continuum economy is restricted in a very natural way to be
only feasible between a finite number of agents at the same time. Hence they only
allow finite coalitions to form. The consequences of this restriction on core theory
leads to a refinement of the core called the f-core.
A second approach consists of representing an incomplete communication structure
directly by some graph on the set of economic agents. The seminal work by Myerson
(1977) describes such a graph theoretic model of communication to arrive at a
coalition structure in the sense of Aumann and Drèze (1974). This work has led
to many applications in game theory and economic theory. The analysis of Dubey
and Shapley (1979) of the Banzhaf power index is also largely based on a graph
theoretic model, just describing some sort of communication between players in the
game.
The first branch of work in this approach describes these graphs stochasticly.
One assumes that an edge in the graph, representing a relation or (direct) commu-
nication between two economic agents, has a certain probability to occur. So we
get a stochastic graph. The main application of this work is given by Kirman et
al. (1986). One of the main reasons for using stochastic graphs is that one asaumes
that if an agents wants to obtain information he or she informs at random. In our
opinion this is not a proper justification.
Another graph theoretic method is to describe communication structures by
deterministic graphs. The seminal work of Kalai et al. (1978) on middlemen is
based on a given graph on the set of agents. They only consider the three-person
case for which they conclude that the position of the middleman, handling all com-
munication in such an economy, is disadvantageous in the process that leads to the
core. This leads to the conclusion that the core is not a suitable equilibrium concept
in these situations.' In the present paper, however, we follow the line as developed
in Gilles and Ruys (1988). There it is argued that to describe a graph theoretic
lA game theoretic generalization of the middleman concept can be found in Muto et al. (1987),
though they do not refer to the work of Kalai et al. (1978).
2model of a communication structure we have to apply the following postulate in
economic theory rigourously. If we assume that we are able to describe economic
agents properly by some well chosen set of attributes, then this suitable choice of
attributes also has to describe the relations between the agents partially. (This
is also the basic idea of the core-like equilibrium concept as developed by Grodal
(1972).) Hence, if we give a typology of the agents, we are not only describing those
agents individually, but also partially the relations between those agents.
Our starting point is therefore a graph theoretic model of a set of agents
with limited communication, which can be embedded in some (topological) attribute
space. In this way we are able to describe graph theoretic models of large economies
in a topological attribute space. Such a description is called a typology.
With the use of such typologies we then can present a very general theory
of coalition formation, which leads to a situation that fits the basic assumptions oí
the coalitional approach. In fact we define collections of (primitive) coalitions to
be models of coalition formation, if such a collection can be derived from such a
typified graph theoretic model of an economy with limited communication. Thus
we are able to give a very general justification of the use of coalitional or coalition
structures in describing economies with limited communication.
The main result in this paper concerns the existence of a measure, which
measures the size of a primitive coalition, based on information contained in the
typology of the graph theoretic model. It turns out that with very little additional
information we are able to construct such a non-trivial measure, and therefore to
complete the procedure of developing a coalitional structure from a graph theoretic
model of a communication structure. Moreover, this shows that we are able to give
nice economic interpretations to the notion of a"primitive coalition" by using the
proper model of coalition formation.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we give a summary of
the model of Gilles and Ruys (1988), and we develop the main tools of that model
which we will apply in the current paper. Hence, besides the model, we state the
main result on the nature of communication in such typified economies.
In the third section we apply the model as developed in the second section
on the problem of coalition formation. We give the minimal properties which such
a model of coalition formation has to satisfy. We then formulate the main result,
3which gives the pattern of information needed to produce a coalitional structure
in the model of coalition formation as presented in Gilles (1987). Thus we have
developed a procedure to construct a coalitional structure from a graph theoretic
model of an economy with limited communication. This suits perfectly with the
traditional general equilibrium theory without restrictions on communication and
on coalition formation as presented in Aumann (1964), Hildenbrand (1974) and
Mas-Colell (1985).
In the fourth section we give an explicit example of a model of coalition
formation. This particular model is based on a generalized notion of a middleman,
which is called a network. (This notion is developed also in Gilles and Ruys (1988),
while in Gilles, Ruys and Shou Jilin (1989) the problem of the existence of such net-
works is discussed.) In short, a network is a coalition which potentially can handle
all communication in the communication structure. In this particular example we
define "primitive" coalitions to be those groups of agents, for which the members
have the same poaition with respect to the chosen collection of networks.
The additional structure of this example leads us to restate our main result.
Now we are able, even with less (additional) information, to guarantee the existence
of a measure to complete the description of the process of coalition formation. This
particularly turns out to be economically a very useful description of the process
of coalition formation. It gives nice economic interpretations, and therefore forms
a stable foundation of the coalitional approach.
We conclude this paper with some remarks.
2 Populations and Typologies
In this section we give an overview of the theory as developed in Gilles and Ruys
(1988). Since the purpose of this paper is to present an explicit model of coalition
formation, based on the axiom of descriptive modelling, we only give the most
relevant parts of this theory.
To give a proper description of the principle of typifying agents in an envi-
ronment with limited communication, as mentioned in the introduction, we have
to introduce two primitive economic notions. The first primitive economic notion
is that of a collection of agents with an incomplete communication structure. We
call such a class of agents with limited communication a population.
4Mathematically we describe a population as a determiniatic graph, in which
the vertices are denoting the agents in the population, while the edgea are describing
the direct relationships between the agents in the population. Naturally we assume
that the graph, which is describing such a population, is incomplete itself.
DeBnition 2.1 A pair (A,R) ia a population if
~,A ie a eet of economic agente ;
~ R C .A x,A ie a aymmetric and reflexive relation on the eet of agente .A.
It is clear that a population - or relational etructure - is an undirected graph. In thia
paper we will assume that this graph can be finite as well as infinite, in particular
uncountable. In the uncountable case it is especially interesting to have a model
of coalition formation and to arrive at a coalitional structure as described in Gilles
(1987). However to describe such an uncountable population we have to impose
some more mathematical structure. This will be done by means of introducing a
second primitive notion, namely an attrióute epace.
Our starting point is the observation that in case of limited communication between
the agents in the economy, those agents have individual as well as social character-
istics. Now the attribute space, i.e., the collection of attributes, describes all those
characteristics, individual as well as social. Hence, an attribute is an abstract char-
acteristic or an abstraction of a certain collection of characteristics of the agents in
the population. The attribute space therefore may consist of individual attributes
such as (production) capacities, preferences, and endowments as well as social or
socialized attributes such as language, and institutional membership.
Mathematically we represent the collection of attributes by a topological
space. From the existing literature on general equilibrium theory it is obvious
that it is common practice to use metric or metrizable spaces as attribute spaces.
(We refer to Hildenbrand (1974), and especially to Grodal (1974) for an extensive
analysis of attribute spaces.)
Deflnition 2.2 A topological epace (C,r) ie called an attribute space if it aatiafiea
the Tl-eeparation property, i.e., for every two pointe x,y E C, euch that x~ y, there
exiate an open eet V E r such that (x E V and y~ V~ or ~y E V and x~ V~.
5Note that we do not exclude metric or Hausdorff spaces with this definition, but
that we take the topological space as general as possible. The space (C,r) can also
be denoted as the space of characteri~tic~. (See for instance Hammond, Kaneko and
Wooders (1987) and Gilles and Ruys (1988).) For some theorems below we need to
impose some stronger conditions on the topological space (C,r) or on a subspace
of it.
One of the fundamental problems in descriptive economic theory is to find a suit-
able description of the collection of economic agents by tuples of attributes in an
attribute space. In the literature it is assumed that there exists such a description
in the form of a mapping from the set of agents into the chosen attribute space.
(See for this principle Hildenbrand (1974) and Mas-Colell (1985).) This pertains to
the case of complete communication. Gilles and Ruys (1988) have formulated this
principle for the case of incomplete communication. The principle has then to be
modified in the sense that agents do not only have individual characteristics, but
also prominent social characteristics. We now assume that there exists a mapping
from the population (A, R) into a chosen attribute space (C, r) , which is a suitable
description of that population in the attribute space, and hence satisfies certain
properties concerning the description of the social characteristics by the chosen
collection of attributes. These properties are formulated in the next definition.
Deflnition 2.3 Let (A, R) be a population and let (C, r) 6e an attribute apace.
The pair (A, R) ie a typology of (A, R) in the attribute epace (C, r) if there exiata
a mapping g:.A -~ C whách aati~fiee the following propertiea:
1. A:-g(A)CC;
R:- {(x,y) ~ d(a,(j) E R~uch that x- g(a) and y - g(~)} C A x A.
2. For every point a E A and every pair of agente a,Q E g-1(a) there exiata a
finite eequence ryl, ..., ryn E g-1(a), for ~ome n E N, where N ia the aet of al!
non-negative natural numbera, euch that
~ a-7i ;
~ ~-ryn ;
~(1'i,1"i}1) E R Íor every j - 1, ..., n- 1.
63. For every po:nt a E A there eziata an open neighbourhood Ua E r auch that
bEUQnA~(a,6)ER.
4. There exiata an at moat countable aequence (Cn)nEN of pairwiae diajoint topo-
logically connected aubaeta of the reatricted attribute apace (A,r~A) auch that
A - UnEN Cn.
The definition above describes the process of embedding or modelling a population
(,A, R) in the chosen attribute space (C, r) . The mapping g from the collection of
agents .A to the restricted attribute space (A,r~A) is called a characterization of
that population in that particular attribute space. Furthermore, the points in the
set A, being a subset of E, are called typea.
From the definition above it follows that a type is an image of a certain
collection of agents with the same attributes and that these agents are socially
closely related in the sense that they are able to communicate with each other
through one another. In fact this implies that we assume that the attribute space
is rich enough to permit a description creating such types.
The third property as mentioned in Definition 2.3 describes the basic idea of
Grodal (1972), that similar agents are also socially related to each other. In fact it
describes an interdependency of individual and social characteristics of agents. We
note that individual characteristics are influencing relationships between agents, but
also that these relationships influence individual characteristics such as preference.
Secondly, this condition reflects our ideas on the partial description of relations
between agents by means of attributes of the agents.
Fro mathematics it can be learned that the last property on the characteri-
zation of a population (A, R) in the attribute space (C, r) implies that the restricted
attribute space (A,r~A) consists of at most countable componenta. (A component
of a topological space is defined as a maximal topologically connected subset of
that topological space. See also the appendix.) Given a typology of the popula-
tion (A, R) in some given attribute space (C, r) , we call the at most countable
sequence of components of the restricted attribute space (A,r~A) the aubdiviaion of
the typology (A, R). Thís subdivision will be denoted by (An)nEN.
The assumption that there exists a characterization for the population (A, R) in
the attribute space (C, r) is called the Axiom of Descriptive Modelling. It
7is the main axiom of economic theory, since it assumes that we can describe the
economic behaviour of the agents in the economy by representing the agents by their
attributes. Hence, it is also a reflection of the common believe that it is possible to
describe individual as well as social charateristics by chosing the proper attributes.
In the next definitions we describe some social phenomena in the setting of
a typology (A, R) of the population (A, R) in the attribute space (C, r) , which can
also be extended easíly to the general setting of the population (A, R) itself.
Deflnition 2.4 The type-relation mapping of a typology (A, R) ie the mapping
F: A--~ 2A, for every type a E A given by
F(a) :- {b E A ~(a, 6) E R}.
It is clear that for every type a E A, the set F(a) is describing the collection
of related typea of a in the typology (A, R). The "connectedness" property on a
typology to be defined next turns out to be crucial in nearly all results. Before we
are able to state the main definition, we have to define a technical tool first.
Definition 2.5 Let (A, R) be a typology and let the aequence (A„)„EN be ita uniquely
defined aubdivieion.
A paár(A, R) áa a condensation of (A, R) ín the reatricted attribute apace (A, r~A)
if Á C A, R C A x Á, and there exiata a aurjective mapping C: A~ Á auch that
the following propertiea are aatiafied:
1. For every integer n E N and any two typea a, b E A„ it holda that C(a) - C(b).
,~. For any two integera n, m E N, n ~ m, and all typea a E A„ and b E A,n it
holda that C(a) ~ C(b).
3. (a, b) E R if and only if there exiat integera n, m E N, and two typea x E A„
and y E A,,, auch that C(x) - a, C(y) - 6, and furthermore (x,y) E R.
It is not difl~icult to see that there always exists a condensation of a typology (A, R)
in the restricted attribute space (A,T~A) . With the use of the notion of condensa-
tion we are now able to define the main property of a typology with respect to the
social characteristics of the agents in the population.
8Definition 2.8 A typology (A, R) ie component-connected if there exiata a con-
deneation (.4, R) of (A, R) in the reatricted attribute apace (A,r~A) , which ie a
finitely connected graph, i.e., for every two point~ á,b E A there exiata an integer
n E N and a aequence c~, ..., c„ E A auch that
~ c1-á;
~ c„-b;
~ for every j - 1, ..., n- 1: (c~, c~~l) E 1i.
Connectedness is a quite natural condition on relational models. It just prescribes
that there exist communication lines between all groups of types which are socially
close to each other. These classes or groups of types can also be called macro-typea.
To show the importance of the notion of component-connectedness we state one of
the main results on communication within a population. It gives a full description of
component-connectedness in terms of communication within the original population
and in the typology itself.
Lemma 2.7 (Gilles and Ruys ( 1988))
Let (A, R) be a typology of the population (A, R) in the topological apace (C, r) .
Then the following atatementa are equivalent:
1. (A, R) i~ component-connected.
~. For every two typea a,b E A there exiete an integer n E N and a finite aequence
of typea cl, ..., c„ E A auch that cl - a, c„ - b and for every j- 1, ... n- 1:
(c„c~tt) E R.
3. For every two agenta a„0 E.A there exieta an integer n E N and a finite
aequence of agent~ ryl, ..., ry„ E A euch that ryl - a, ry„ -~3 and for every
j- 1, ... n- 1: (ry~, ry~}1) E R, i.e., any two agenta in the population are able
to communicate to each other.
3 Models of Coalition Formation
In this section we develop our main application of the model as presented in the
previous section. We explicitly base a(general) model of coalition formation on
9the axi~m of descriptive modelling in situations with limited communication, as
form~ilated in the model of typifying agents in a topological attribute space.
Hence we start írom a population (A, R) , i.e., a class of agents with con-
straints on their possibilities to communicate imposed by a given relational struc-
ture, and a topological attribute space (C, r) satisfying the Tl-separation property.
It is our purpose to give a general definition of a model of coalition formation, which
is only based on the information contained in a typology (A, R) of the population
(A, R) in the topological attribute space (C, r) . The application of the axiom of
descriptive modelling is therefore crucial. Only if we accept this axiom, we are able
to construct such a description of coalition formation.
With the use of such a model of coalition formation, we arrive at a situ-
ation, which satisfies the requirements of the setting as developed in Gilles (1987
and 1988a). Hence we get an economy, in which limitations and constraints in
communication have lead to the formation of a limited number of "natural" coali-
tions, which we will call primitive coalition9. This kind of modelling of coalition
formation gives some additional insight in models based on coalitional structures.
Hence these model are in fact also models of situations with limited communication,
but it is described differently. Such a model makes use of the final outcomes of an
undescribed process of coalition formation. In this case these outcomes are called
"primitive" coalitions.
Before we can define the main tools in such a description of coalition formation,
as described above, we make some conventions with respect to the mathematical
notation. Let S be a set, then we denote by 2S :- {E ~ E C S} the set of all subsets
oí S, including the empty set. Now let 0 ~~ C 2S be a collection of subsets of S.
Then we make the following conventions.
~ We define S2(~) C 2S as the following collection of subsets of S generated by
~:
N
SZ(~) :- { U En~N E N, En E ~ pairwise diajoint}
n-1
~ The collection ~ is a half-ring on S if for every pair E, F E ~ it holds that
E`F and E f1 F E ~, i.e., ~ is closed for taking differences and intersections.
10~ The collection ~ is a semi-ring on S if 0 E~ and for every pair E, F E ~ it
holds that E`F and E fl F E H(~), where f2(~) is defined as above.
For a full exposition of the mathematical concept of semi-ring we refer to Janssen
and van der Steen (1984). Besides the notions as defined above, we will also use
the well known concepts of a a-algebra and a ring on a set S. (We remind that
a Q-algebra is closed for taking complements and countable unions, while a ring is
closed for taking set theoretic differences and finite unions.)
Additionally we make the convention that for a given non-empty collection
~ of subsets of a set S, we denote by Q(~) C 2S, and w(~) C 2S respectively the
o-algebra, and the ring generated by the collection ~. Hence v(~) is tlie emalleat
o-algebra on S which contains ~ as a sub-collection. Finally we state some simple
properties of these collections on a given set S:
1. Any ~-algebra on S is a ring on S.
2. Any ring on S is a half-ring on S.
3. Any half-ring on S is also a semi-ring on S.
4. If ~ is a semi-ring on S, then St(~) - w(~).
Examples show that the distinction between a half-ring and a semi-ring as made
above is justified, because there exist collections which generate strictly smaller
semi-rings than half-rings. We mention a simple example on the set S:- [0, 2] x
[0, 3] C RZ. Take the collection ~:- {[0, 2] x[0, 2], [0, 2] x[1, 3], [0,1] x[0, 3]} of
subsets of S. We leave it to the reader to find out that indeed the half-ring generated
by ~, i.c., the amalleet half-ring on S which contains ~ as a sub-collection, is strictly
larger than the semi-ring generated by ~.
The example above shows that there is a technical difference between a
semi-ring and a half-ring. In the sequel we will see that for economic purposes it
may be plausible to use half-rings rather than semi-rings. However, for the sake of
generality we will use semi-rings in all formal definitions.z
The technical tools as defined above are used to describe a model of a class of
economic agents, in which limited or incomplete communication is reflected directly
~Since any half-ring is a semi-ring, it is obvious that we do not exclude casea with a halí-ring
with this convention.
11in constraints on coalition formation. This coalitional approach starts from a given
collection of truly or naturally feasible coalitions. Through an explicit procedure of
coalition formation this collection is then extended to the collection of all feasible
coalitions.
We now give the basic model of coalition formation as formulated in Gilles
(1987 and 1988a), which forms our benchmark of the coalitional approach. The
class of agents A is endowed with a collection of evidently feasible coalitions, and
a measure denoting every coalítion in that collection with some size. Such a con-
struction will be called a coalitional atructure. Formally we define this concept as
follows:
Deflnition 3.1 Let A be a aet of agenta. The triple (A,I',~) ia a coalitional
structure if the fo(lowing propertiea are aatiafred:
(i) I' C 2A ia a aemi-ring on Já ;
(ii) p: I' ---~ [0,1] ia a normaliaed meaaure on (A, P), i.e.,
1. u(0) - o ;
2. p, ia Q-additive on I', i.e., for every aequence (En)nEN of pairwiae diajoint
elemente in I' át holda that if ~J;`1 En E I', then
Y~( V En) -~ Í~(En) i
n-1 n-1
3. sup{~„o1~(En) ~ En E I', n E N, pairwiae diajoint} - 1.
In the context of a coalitional structure the elements in the semi-ring I' are called
primitive coalitiona. Note that the definition above expresses our feeling from lim-
ited communication, so that only finite operations on the generated primitive coali-
tions are feasible. Especially in our model where communication is in principle
defined by finite chains of relations between agents, it is not appropriate to allow
for infinite unions and intersections of primitive coalitions as being truely feasible
coalitions. This is expressed in the property that the collection of primitive coali-
tions I' has to be a semi-ríng instead of the more restrictive assumption that it is a
v-algebra on A.3
3In some respects we can also interpret this condition as a minimal condition on the collection
of primitive coalitions. Any class which is at least a aemi-ring will do, and hence any o-algebra will
fit these demands.
12lt is our purpose to construct a procedure which leads from a given typology
(A, R) of the population (.A, R) in the attribute space (C,T) to a coalitional structure
(A, I', ~). This procedure then explicitly describes a model of the formation of
primitive coalition. Next we will give some conditions, which such a procedure has
to satisfy minimally. A procedure, satisfying those minimal requirements, is called
a model of coalátáon formation. Formally we define thís as follows:
Deflnition 3.2 Let (A,R) be a typology of the population (A,R) in the nttribute
space (C,T) and let g be the characterization of this particular typology.
A collection ry(A, R) C 2A of subsets of A is a model of coalition formation on
(A, R) , áf it satisfies the following properties:
(i) ry(A, R) is only based on information contained in (A, R) in the sense that there
exàsts a collection r C o'(r~A) such that
ry(A, R) -{g-r(E) ~ E E I'}.
(ii) ry(A, R) is a semi-ring on .A.
If there exists a normalised measure Ic : y(A, R) ---~ [0, 1~, then (A, ry(A, R),Et) is a
coalátáonal structure generated by (A, R).
We call the members of a model of coalition formation ry(A, R) on (A, R) also
primitive coalátions.
It is clear that the collection I' as introduced in Definition 3.2 condition (i)
is also a semi-ring on A. Furthermore it is obvious that any triple (,,4, y(A, R),Y,)
as constructed in the last part of Definition 3.2 is indeed a coalitional structure. It
expresses the basic postulate that a model of coalition formation has to be based
on information inferred from a typology of the population at hand. Note that we
assume - in condition (ii) of Definition 3.2 - that the collection I' has to consist of
Borel-sets only. This measurability condition seems however quite natural. It makes
explicitly what has been assumed implicitly in the traditional setting of Aumann
(1964) and Hildenbrand (1974).
The main question of this section is with how much additional information
on a typology of the population we are able to construct a coalitional structure on
that population, including a measure, if these minimal requirements are satisfied.
So we investigate under which conditions on the typology and requirements with
13rrspect t~~ additional informatiun un macro-types, we are able to generate a coali-
tional structure. To solve the existence of a measure, which completes a coalitional
structure, we first need some tools.
Deflnition 3.3 Let (.4, R) be a population and let (C, r) be an attribute apace. The
population (A, R) can 6e modelled properly in (C, r) if there exiata a typology
(A, R) of (A, R) in (C, r) auch that
(i) (A, R) is component-connected ;
(ii) The aubdivision of A, denoted by (A„)„EN, aatiafiea the following pmperties:
~ There exists a sequence of real numbers (b„)„EN, auch that b„ ? 0(n E
N) and ~ b„ - 1, where b„ describea the fraction of the types in A who
are member of the component (or macro-type~ A,,, n E N.
~ For every integer n E N the component A„ C A ia a compact subaet of
the restricted attribute space (A,r~A) .
A typology (A,R) of (A,R) ín (C,r) which aatiafiea all conditiona aa formulated
above ia called a proper typology.
Obviously if a population can be modelled properly, then we not only assume that
there is sufficient information available on the attributes of the agents to describe
the relations between those agents locally by those attributes, but additionally we
assume that there is information about the size of the groups of types of agents,
who are (socially) "close" to each other with respect to those attributes. Hence
we suppose that there is additional information about the size of macro-types, or
the corresponding classes of agents in the population itself. In fact this implies
that we assume some knowledge about the aggregated population. This additional
information is reflected in two ways, topologically and measure theoretically.
Topologically we reflect the additional information in the assumption that
the components are topologically compact subsets in the restricted attribute space
(A,r~A) . So we actually assume that in some way each class of agents in the
population who are (socially) "close" to each other, is bounded. This seems to be
a very natural requirement.
In meaaure theoretic terms we assume that the size of a component or macro-
type can be expressed explicitly by some non-negative number or fraction. In fact
14this requires that we indeed can measure the size of those macro-types, or the
corresponding classes of "close" agents in the population. This implies the ezistence
of knowledge about the aggregated population in explicit terms.
By stating the conditions under which there exists a non-trivial measure on
some model of coalition formation, satisfying the requirements of Definition 3.2, we
have completed the procedure of formulating a very general description of modelling
coalition formation based on a particular typology of the population.
Theorem 3.4 (Existence)
Let (A, R) 6e a population, which can 6e modelled properly in the topological at-
tríbute space (C, r) . Furthermore let (A, R) 6e a proper typology of (A, R) in (C, r)
and let ry(A, R) 6e a model of coalition formation baeed on that proper typology.
If the restrácted attribute epace (A,r~A) ia a locally connected and metrizable apace,
then there exists a non-trivial meaaure E.c : ry(A, R) -~ [0,1], euch that the triple
(A, ry(A, R), ~) ie a coalitáonal etructure.
PROOF
Let (A, R) be the typology as described above, and let the sequence ( An)nEN be its
subdivision.
For any integer n E N, the component A„ is a connected, compact, locally con-
nected, and metrizable subspace of the restricted attribute space (A, r~A) . ( Local
connectedness of An follows from Theorem (10.2.3) of Császàr ( 1978) and the fact
that An is closed as well as open in the restricted attribute space (A,r~A) .) By
application of the Hahn-Mazurkiewicz theorem (see appendix) there exista a con-
tinuous function fn : I--a A„ - where I - [0,1] is the unit-interval - which is
surjective.
Now we define v: Q(r~A) --~ I as the measure which is defined by
~(F) -- ~ bn~`(fn'(F n An))
n-1
where F E o(r~A) is any Borelset of the restricted attribute space (A, r~A) , bn is
as given in Definition 3.3, and .~ is the Lebesgue measure on (I,o(EI)). (Here E~ is
the Euclidean topology on the unit-interval I, and hence a-(EI) is the collection of
Borelsets on the unit-interval.)
15It is obvious that v is a measure on v(r~A), since for every integer n E N the
mapping j„ is continuous. Thus for any set F E ~(r~A), the domain f„1(F) is
fiurel uicasurahlc, i.e., J„'(L~') ~ rr(r~A).
Next take the given model of coalition formation ry(A, R) with respect to the typol-
ogy as fixed in the theorem. For every primitive coalition F E ry(A, R) we define
p,(F) :- v(g(F)), where g is the characterization of (A, R). We show that ~ is
indeed a normalised measure on (A,~y(A,R)).
First note that ~(0) - v(g(~)) - v(0) - 0.
To prove that li, is a~-additive function on ry(A,R) we note that by definition 3.2
there exists a semi-ring P on A such that ry(A,R) -{g-1(E)~E E I'}. Now take a
sequence (E„)„EN of pairwise disjoint members of -y(A, R) such that UE„ E y(A, R).
Next note that for every n E N there exists a set of types F„ E P such that
E„ - g-1(F„). Since (E„)„EN consists of pairwise disjoint sets, it is evident that
(F„)„EN consists also of pairwise disjoint sets. Hence g-'(UF„) - Ug-1(F„) - UE,,.
And so
F~(UEn) - l~(9-1(UF„)) - v(gg-'(UF„) - v(uF„) -
- ~ v(Fn) - ~ v(gg-1 (Fn)) - E ~(E„).
Hence we have proved that ~C is ~-additive.
From the definition of p, with using the properties of v, and the o--additivity of p it
is easily established that p also satisfies the normalisation property. This completes
the proof that ~, is a normalised measure, and hence the triple (A,ry(A,R),{i) is a
coalitional structure on the set of agents A.
Q.E.D.
To illiistrate the posaibilities of further applications of the framework as sketched
above, we give a characterization of a standard atomless coalitional structure, which
describes the perfectly competitive case. This result confirms the description of
perfectly competitive economies as given in Gilles (1988a). There it was concluded
that a continuum economy has a very pluriform social structure. In our framework
it leads to a restatement of this conclusion in terms of pluriformity of types in the
population.
Theorem 3.5 Let (,A, R) 6e a population which can be modelled properly in a
proper typology (A,R), aa defined in Definitíon 5.3. Aaaume that there exieta a
16coalitiona! structure (A, ry(A, R), p,), which is generated by (A, R) auch that the fol-
lowing assumptions are satisfied:
(~) 7'he extended measure space (A,a(ry(A,R)),~) is atomless ;
(ii) For every integer n E N it holds that g-1(An) E~(ry(A, R)) and N.(g-1(A„)) -
ón.
Then for alln E N with bn ~ 0 it holds that the component A„ is a continuum, i.e.,
consists of uncountably many types.
PROOF
Take the measure spaces (A,ry(A,R),{~) and (A,a(ry(A,R)),~) as given in the the-
orem. Next take an integer n E N such that b„ ~ 0.
Since g-1(A„) E o(ry(A, R)) and it holds that N,(g-1(A„)) - b„ ) 0 it follows from
application of the atomlessness condition that there exists a set F E~(ry(A, R))
such that F C g-1(A„) and
O C 1~(F) c l~(g '(A„)) - b,,.
But this implies that g(F) E~(T~A) and that g(F) C A,,. Moreover it implies that
A„ `g(F) ~ 0 and g(F) ~ 0. But then it easily follows that ~A„ ~ 2, and hence
by connectedness of the components that A„ consists of uncountably many types.
Q.E.D.
4 An Example
In this section we construct an example of a model of coalition formation, which
does not only give a nice application of the theory of networks as developed in
Section 4 of Gilles and Ruys (1988), but also gives more insight into the general
theory as developed in the previous section. The example is based on coalition
formation in case of the occurrence of networks or hierarchical syatema of networks
in the population. For a detailed description and interpretation of the notion of
network we refer to Gilles and Ruys (1988) and Gilles, Ruys, and Shou Jilin (1989).
In this section we only define this concept and give a quick reformulation of its
main properties.
17Deflnition 4.1 Let (A, R) be a typology.
A set of types N C A is a network in (A, R) if it satisfies the following conditions:
Reachability: The collection of sets {F(a)~a E N} is a covering of A;
Connectivity: The graph (N, R~N), with R~N :- R rl (N x N), is finitely con-
nected, i.e., for every two types a,b E N there ia a finite sequence of typea
cl, ..., c„ E N such that a- cl, b- c„ and moreover for every j - 1, ..., n-1
it holds that (c„c~~l) E R~N ;
Minimality: The set N C A is minimal in the sense that for every t~pe a E N it
holda that N`{a} does not satisfy the reachability condition or the connectivity
condition.
From the definition it is clear that a network is a class of types which satisfies a
minimal set of properties of an organásatàon system in the typology of the popula-
tion. In other words, a network is a latent or potential organisation structure in
the economy. Which of those latent organisation structures becomes active is not
only depending on the social structure of the economy, as reflected in the typology,
but also on individual behaviour of the agents in the population. This is however
not the issue of this example.
For our application of networks in a model of coalition formation, we in-
troduce the economic notion of active network. As described above a network is
active if it is a network, which is an organisation structure, which is actually used
or activated for the given situation in the economy. Hence, in an active network the
participating agents do not only have the social abilities, but also the individual
capacities to perform a task which is required in the cause of existence of the active
network. Note that an active network is always constructed in the context of the
chosen typology, and therefore in the context of the chosen problem of study. In cas
of a health economy the physicians may form a network, while in case of exhaustible
resources this network is completely irrelevant.
We also note that in certain cases there may be more than one active network
in the economy. This depends on the chosen typology (A, R). For example in a
general equilibrium model, it may be the case that for every commodity there is an
active network handling the provisíon of all agents with that particular commodity.
To be as general as possible, we therefore introduce a collection O of active networks
in the economy at hand. This family is a subcollection of the collection ~Y of all
18networks in the typology (A, R). We will not address the questions how to construct
such farnilies of active networks, but only assume the existence of such a family.
Before we give a formal description of the exainple of coalition formation, we recall
that by o(~) and w(~) we denote the o-algebra and the ring respectively generated
by some collection of subsets ~ of some set S. By ry(~) and r!(~), we will denote
the aemi-ring and the half-ring respectively, generated by ~. We now ceme to the
main definition of this section.
Definition 4.2 Let (~ ~ O C~ 6e a family of active networka ín (A, R).
(a) The claaa S(O) :- {F(a) ~ dN E O: a E N} C 2A ia the service structure
generated by U.
(b) Let g 6e the characterization of (.A,R) in (C,r) , i.e., (A,R). Then the aemi-
ring 1'o r- ry(g -~(S((U))) C 2A, which ia generated 6y the aervíce atructure
S(O) on (A, R), ia called the model of coalition formation generated by
O on (A, R) . If there exiata a meaaure p, on the meaaurable epace (,.Q, I'e ),
then the triple (A, I'o,lc) ía called the coalitional structure generated by
O.
First of all we note that we restrict ourselves to families of relevant networks in
the typology (A, R). This is only an economic restriction. These kind of families
of networks are determined by economic features such as economic activity, or
positions of agents in the population which is based on certain characteristics, for
example medical ones. This also explains the name of the collection S(O): it
describes the specific structure of how agents in the population are serviced by the
(active) networks in O.
As provided by the service structure we base coalition formation, as defined
and described in Definition 4.2(b), on posátiona of agenta within the aervice atruc-
ture as generated by the family O of active networks. Hence we take that service
structure as given. The primitive coalitions, i.e., the members of I'o, are then taken
as those groups of agents, which belong to types in the typology who have the same
position with respect to that service structure. Hence we construct the primitive
coalitions on the positions of the agents with respect to the chosen networks.
If we take for the collection of primitive coalitions the half-ring generated by
the service structure, i.e., I'o -~(g-'(S(O))), then we explicitly use all available
19information contained in the typology with respect to positions of agents in the
service structure. The construction of a half-ring reveals much more the information
used, than the construction of a smaller semi-ring based on the same information.
In some cases the semi-ring does not contain certain trivial primitive coalitions,
which are quite natural in case that coalition formation is essentially based on the
positions of the agents as described above.
To arrive at the existence of a non-trivial measure for this specific example
of coalition formation, we have to define a notion concerning the measurability of
a typology.
Deflnition 4.3 The typology (A, R) of the population (A,7Z) in the attribute apace
(C, r) is measurable if for every type a E A it holds that
F(a) E a(r~A).
Again this measurability condition can be interpreted as a"natural" property of a
typology. With the use of this property we are able to reformulate Theorem 3.4 of
a non-trivial coalitional structure. Here we can use the additional structure of this
specific example in full detail.
Proposition 4.4 Let (A, R) 6e a meaaurable proper typology of (A, R) in the at-
tribute space (C, r) and let cY be the collection of networka. Furthermore let ~}~
O C~Y be a family of active networks. Then:
(a) The collection Ió C 2A ia a model of coalition formation in the aenae of Deft-
nition 3.,~.
(b) If the restricted attràbute apace (A,r~A) is locally connected and metrizable,
then there exista a non-trivial measure p: I'o --~ [0,1] auch that the triple
(,A, I'o, ~) ia a coalitional structure.
PROOF
It is obvious that we only have to prove that part (a) is true, since (b) follows
immediately from application of Theorem 3.4 to this particular situation. To prove
(a) we check whether the three conditions of a model of coalition formation are
satisfied. By applying the definition of I'e and the measurability of (A,R) this is
easily established.
20Q.E.D.
From the statement of the proof it is obvious that we also may take the half-ring,
the ring, and even the ~-algebra generated by the semi-ring I'a instead of the semi-
ring itself. It is also clear that only the íormulations of the existence result with
the semi-ring Po or the half-ring ~(I'o) are economically useful.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have constructed a general theory on coalition formation in the
setting of typified populations as developed in Gilles and Ruys (1988). We have
constructed a minimal set of conditions, which such models of coalition formation
have to satisfy in order to arrive at a coalitionul structure. In a coalitional struc-
ture limitations in communication are translated into a limited collection of truely
feasible coalitions, the so-called primitive coalitiona. Moreover this structure is de-
scribed as a non-classical measure space, and hence it is a variation on the well
known models of Aumann (1964) and Hildenbrand (1974) on large economies. (For
a detailed discussion we refer to Gilles (1987 and 1988a).)
In this paper we have developed a theory on coalition formation, which has a
broad perspective. It namely sketches the way of constructing a coalitional structure
from a typified population of some economy, and hence the way from graph theoretic
models of constrained communication into coalitional theories of large economies.
We note that in general a coalitional structure describes a situation with large as
well as negligible agents, and therefore the theory of Shitovitz (1973) fits well in
this perspective.
This also makes clear that core theory as developed in measure theoretic
models can also easily be translated to the setting of a typified economy as sketched
in Gilles and Ruys (1988) with the use of a model of coalition formation. Chosing
the proper form of such a model of coalition formation then becomes one of the
crucial questions of such a theory.
We further remark that this general theory on models of coalition formation
has a value on its own, because it states that any model of coalition formation will
be satisfactory if it satisfies this minimal set of conditions. We therefore can search
for models oí coalition formation, which are based on empirical observations, only
taking into account these conditions.
21In the second part of this paper we have developed an explicit example of such a
model of coalition formation, which was only based on the theory of networka as
developed in Gilles and Ruys (1988). This example has important features since it
gives a proper foundation to the notion of primitive coalition, as the basic concept
in the coalitional theories of large economies of Gilles (1987 and 1988a).
With the use of interpretations of the notions of network or híerarchical
eyeteme of networke, as developed in Gilles (1988b), we are now able to give a
fundamental economic or social interpretation of the notion of primitive coalition.
This influences the valuation of the coalitional theories of large economies, and
gives further insight into the results as stated in those kind of theories. It is also
possible to translate these results to models, which are based on typifications or
graph theoretic models of communication, such as sketched in Theorem 3.5. There
a result oí Gilles (1988a) on the pluriformity of atomless economies is restated
in terms of a typified population in a graph theoretic model on communication
structures in economic environments. This makes clear that the pluriformity result
is very generic.
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24Appendix : Topological Spaces
In this appendix we will discuss some definitions and theorems as formulated in
Császár (1978). For further elaborations of the topics as discussed here, we refer to
that book on general topology.
The pair (E,r) is called a topological apace if E is a set of point and r is a
collection of subsets of E such that the empty set 0 E r and r is closed for taking
arbitrary unions and finite intersections. The elements in the collection r are called
open eeta in (E, r).
Let (E,r) be a topological space, and F C E. The interior of F, which we
denote by int F, is the largest open set H E r such that H C F.
Deflnition 1 Let (E, r) be a topological apace, and let x E E be a point in that
apace. A clasa of aeta Vx C 2E ia the neighbourhood system of x if it aatiafiea
the following propertiea:
1. For every eet F E Vx, x E F.
t. If E E Vx and F~ E, then alao F E Vx.
3. If E ia an open aet and x E E, then E E Vz.
The elementa in the neighbourhood ayatem Vz of x are called neighbourhoods of
x in the topology r.
DeBnition 2 Let (E, r) be a topological apace, and let Vz be the neighbourhood
ayatem of x E E. A claaa B C Vz of neighbourhooda ia a neighbourhood base of
x in r if it aatiafiea the following propertíea:
1. For every aet F E B, x E F.
,~. For every neighbourhood of x, E E Vx, there ie a F E B auch that F C E.
3. For every two E, F E B with E n F~ 0, there exiate G E B auch that
GcEnF.
In the sequel we take a fixed topological space (E, r). For this fixed space we shall
derive some properties. We now come to one of the basic results of topology.
Theorem 3 Let x E E, and let Vx be ita neighbourhood ayatem in r. Then the
claaa of open neighbourhooda of x, Vx n r ia a neighbourhood baee for Vx.
25We are now able to define the main topological tools which are needed in the proofs
of the theorems as developed in this paper.
Deflnition 4
(a) A aet F in the topological apace (E,r) áa connected if there do not exiat two
open aubaeta A, B E r auch that A(1 B n F- 0 and (A U B) f1 F- F.
(b) A aet F in the topological apace ( E, r) ia a component of (E, r) if F ia con-
nected and for every connected aet F C C C E it holda that F- C.
We remark that components of a topological space are just maximal connected
subsets in that space.
'I'o atate the Ilahfc-A9azw~ki~~wicz theoretn, we have to develop some cnore tools,
especially that of a locally connected continuum. This important result of Hahn and
Mazurkiewicz just states that such a locally connected continuum is the continuous
image of the unit-interval with the Euclidean topology.
DeHnition 5 The topological apace (E,r) ia locally connected if every point
x E E haa a neighbourhood baae conaiating of connected aeta only.
Theorem 6 A topological apace ia locally connected if and only if it haa a baae
conaiating of connected aeta only.
Theorem 7 (( 10.2.3) of Csázsár)
Any open aubapace of a locally connected epace ia locally connected aa well.
Furthermore we introduce some more familiar topological notions. First we mention
that a topological space (E, r) is compaet if every open cover of (E, r) has a finite
subcover. Moreover a topological space (E, r) is a continuum if it is a compact
and connected topological space. With the use of these tools and the definitions
above we are able to state one of the main results as used in this paper.
Theorem 8 (Hahn-Mazurkiewicz) Every locally connected metrizable contin-
uum is a continuoua image of the Euclidean apace (Z,1"), with Z- [0,1] the unit-
interval, and E the Euclidean topology on Z.
26The final part of this appendix is devoted to the reversal of the Hahn-Mazurkiewicz
result, and the definition of the most simple separation properties.
Definition 9 The topological apace (E, r) aatiafiea the Tl-separation property if
for every two point x, y E E, with x ~ y, there ia a neighbourhood Ux of x auch that
y~ Us and there ia a neighbourhood U~ of y auch that x~ Uv.
Deflnition 10 (Hausdorff Separation)
The topological apace (E, r) aatiafiea the TZ-separation property if for every two
point x, y E E, with x~ y, there exiat two neighbourhooda, Ud of x and Uv of y, auch
that Ux f1 U~ - Ql. A topologícal apace, which aatàafiea the TZ-aeparation property, ia
uaually called a Hausdorff space.
In the main text of this paper we have assumed that we could give a typology of a
populatíon in a topological space T, which satisfies the Tl- separation property as
defined above. The Hauadorff separation property is much stronger, but is not used
in the development of our theory. This property is however used in the following
statement of the inverse version of the Hahn- Mazurkiewicz theorem.
Theorem 11 Let (El,rl) and (EZ,r2) be two Hauador,ff apacea. If (Ei,rl) ia a
locally connected continuum and there exiata a continuoua aurjection f: El --. EZ ,
then (EZ, rZ) haa the aame property, i.e., it ia alao a locally connected continuum.
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